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Donald Phillip Verene's latest work on Hegel is a precise and 
brief contribution to the "Introduction to Hegel" scholarship. As 
an exercise in brevity, its summation of the Phenomenology is a laud-
able triumph. As a skeletal presentation of the Notion on its road of 
despair, however, it is useful only for two groups of readers: (1) those 
who accept the results of the Hegelian project and who want a sim-
plified and short-hand version of it; and (2) those who are familiar 
with Kant but have misgivings about the foundation of his critical 
and reflective philosophy. It is of little use to Hegel scholars or to 
those who wish to understand the journey of the Notion on its road 
of despair. Those who wish a fuller treatment of this path would 
do better to consult Verene's 1985 work, titled Hegel's Recollection. 
Instructors who seek to provide their advanced undergraduates with 
an introduction to Hegel would benefit from this work, though they 
ought to understand that such a "digest" approach to the Phenom-
enology does great harm to the cogency of Hegel's work. As Verene 
points out of the Phenomenology and Hegel's Science of Logic: These 
"are not books that can be taught; they must be self-taught" (p. 37). 
Having said this, the work is still to be recommended to the 
aforementioned groups of readers. Its central thesis is presented 
with great clarity and coherence. Verene's sentences are crisp and 
discrete, his explanations of difficult concepts are coherently con-
cise, and his exegeses demonstrate a deep knowledge of the primary 
and secondary literatures. There is very little in the book by way of 
argument, however. The bulk of the pages are given over to cursory 
explanations, albeit ones that are correct so far as the length limita-
tions permit. 
The title and subtitle are precise: the book focuses on Hegel's 
concept of the absolute and indeed is an introduction to reading the 
Phenomenology and not an introduction to the Phenomenology itself. 
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The preface thus begins with general advice on reading Hegel as well 
as an introduction to the tasks of Verene's book. The work is com-
posed of a preface, ten chapters, and an appendix of 60 terms used 
in the Hegel corpus (with translation notes for each term). A bibli-
ography of six pages is included. Including all of the above, the book 
totals less than 130 pages, and the reader interested in Hegel is often 
left wanting more. 
The first chapter introduces Hegel's preface to the Phenomenology 
and understands it largely as a response to Kant's critical philosophy. 
The treatment of the preface is about as thorough a treatment as any 
in the entire book. Verene skillfully summarizes Hegel's intensive 
writing into a few pages. He takes approximately ten pages to con-
trast Kantian reflection with Hegelian speculation, and he correctly 
focuses the discussion on Hegel's understanding of speculation as 
rooted in the speculative sentence's destruction of the subject-predi-
cate distinction. He also identifies key paragraphs so that the reader 
can compare Verene's analysis to the original work. 
The second chapter is on Hegel's so-called introduction, and 
Verene summarizes it as an explication of the double Ansich (in-itself) 
of consciousness. Verene is right to place heavy emphasis on this con-
cept in the rest of the book, as the dialectical and speculative motion 
of consciousness from in-itself to for-itself (and back again into the 
in-itself) constitutes the heart of Hegel's methodology—without it, 
there would be no apodicticity to the movement of the Notion from 
sense-certainty towards absolute knowing. Verene repeatedly points 
out that consciousness is in a constant state of trying to re-unify its 
two moments, an appropriate reminder where the Phenomenology is 
concerned. This becomes the central running theme of the entire 
book. 
The third chapter introduces Hegel's concept of reason as specu-
lative and as distinct from the Kantian Notion of understanding. This, 
along with the fourth chapter—titled Hegel's System—summarizes 
Hegel's comprehensive philosophy. There are digressions in these 
two chapters that seem somewhat outside the project of an intro-
duction to reading the Phenomenology, and this reviewer would have 
preferred for these pages to have been spent on further elucidation 
of the dialectic of speculative reason. Nonetheless, the chapters are 
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well-written. The fourth chapter indeed does a decent job of sum-
marizing a corpus that somewhat ironically is easier to summarize 
than is the Phenomenology alone. Verene focuses on the "dialectic of 
Andness" (the An-undfir sich sein, the conjunction of the in-itself and 
for-itself). 
The fifth chapter is titled The Beginning of Phenomenology, and this 
is the proper beginning of the path of despair traveled by conscious-
ness. Verene discusses the extent to which Hegel was justified in 
beginning the path of despair at the level of sense-certainty and the 
thing rather than at the level of mythical forces and energies (as in 
Cassirer, for example). This discussion is a key moment in the exege-
sis, as it demonstrates that Verene sees Hegel as supplying an inter-
pretation of philosophical consciousness and not human consciousness, for 
this is how Verene saves Hegel from Cassirer's attack (p. 44) . This is 
one of the few places in the brief text where the secondary literature 
on Hegel is extensively considered. 
This important fifth chapter is also where Verene introduces and 
defines determinate negation. An earlier and fuller treatment of this 
central Hegelian concept should have been offered, but much of 
what is true about determinate negation is considered in the earlier 
discussion on speculation. 
The sixth chapter is titled Force, Understanding, and the Inverted 
World and covers the movement of consciousness from understand-
ing to dialectical reason. In a puzzling move, no attempt is made 
to define force in its relationship to the Understanding, something 
that Hegel explicitly does in paragraph 136. The chapter instead 
focuses on the "syllogism which has for its extremes the inner being 
of Things and the Understanding, and for its middle term, appear-
ance" (par. 145, quoted on Verene's p. 49) . The syllogism is an AAA-2 
and thus invalid: 
1. Premise One: The inner being of things is distinct from the 
appearance of things. 
2. Premise Two: The understanding of things is distinct from the 
appearance of things. 
3. Conclusion: The understanding of things is distinct from the 
inner being of things. 
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Verene argues that this is precisely the form of "reason" taken 
up by the Understanding with regard to the thing-in-itself. Because 
there is no way to get from the inner being of things to the under-
standing of things, the Kantian philosophy must conclude that the 
thing-in-itself is unknowable according to critical principles. For 
Hegel, as Verene correctly points out, the realization of the logical 
gap in the above syllogism leads consciousness to seek "a single way 
of knowing that can encompass the object and the s e l f (p. 52) . But 
in seeking this, it draws a distinction between itself and the object, 
thus forming itself into self-consciousness. 
Chapter seven is titled Self-Consciousness of Masterhood and Servi-
tude and introduces the stoical acquisition of intellectual indepen-
dence via servitude. Verene cautions us against calling the servant 
(der Knecht) a slave. Hegel clearly does not use the German for slave 
(der Sklave), and we ought therefore to avoid that common move in 
Hegelian translation and exegesis. As a movement into stoicism, this 
step on the road toward absolute knowing is an independence from 
the state—the stoic philosopher is of the state and lives in servitude to 
the state, but he has a higher calling in his love of wisdom and thus 
achieves separation from the will of the state. 
At the same time, this independence leads him into skepticism, 
which Verene defines as an attempt to "reject the world while at 
the same time holding on to it" (p. 64) . Hegel says this is "like the 
squabbling of self-willed children" (par. 205, quoted by Verene). This 
squabbling constitutes the unhappy consciousness (Verene correctly 
indicates that it should more properly be translated "the unfortunate 
consciousness"). This is defined as the skeptical self-consciousness 
of existence as dual-natured and contradictory, and the only answer 
to it is the whole of the speculative philosophy—not merely in its 
results, but in its entire inner movement from sense-certainty to 
absolute knowing. 
The third section of the Phenomenology is addressed in two chap-
ters: chapter nine is a very cursory treatment of the first two chapters 
of the third section (Reason and Spirit). Verene explains the architec-
tonic of the work and the confused labeling scheme of the table of 
contents before turning to the chapter on reason. His first move is to 
explain that reason has become transformed from speculative reason 
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to beobachtende Vernunft—observing reason. The function of this type of 
reason is to observe or examine the object, and insofar as the Notion 
has ascended to self-consciousness at this stage, reason will attempt 
to see itself as an organism having a distinct behavior pattern or psy-
chology. Thus are born physiognomy and phrenology, each of which 
attempts to discern the inner by examination of the outer. Verene 
highlights the vehemence of Hegel's response to these approaches 
(p. 77)—they are, after all, direct competitors to phenomenology. 
From these efforts at internalizing the outer, self-conscious-
ness proceeds to re-unify itself in other ways: pleasure, the law of 
the heart, virtue, and scholarship all become grounding principles 
for self-consciousness as reason—and all of them fail to accomplish 
the desired unification. Having made the attempt, however, reason 
develops the self-confidence to see itself as a lawgiver, as a being that 
can change the world through directed and purposive activity. 
However, this lawmaking power is ineffective outside of the 
social sphere, and this leads reason to change into spirit (Geist). This 
is not the same spirit as in the title of the Phenomenology, but is mod-
ified here into "self-consciousness as a fully social or ethical form 
of being" (p. 82) . The summaries of the various stages of spirit are 
cursory and the transitions rather strained. This is no doubt due to 
attempting to summarize dozens of pages of text into one or two 
paragraphs. The section on spirit is by far the weakest in the book. If 
it is true—as Verene argues—that mastery of the consciousness and 
self-consciousness sections of the Phenomenology supply a reader with 
sufficient tools for a proper understanding of Section C, then per-
haps it would have been best to leave out the digest of this section 
altogether. 
The final chapter is reserved for a fairly full treatment of the 
Phenomenology's final two chapters (Religion and Absolute Knowing), 
wherein Verene summarizes the overall purpose of the Phenomenol-
ogy as showing the path of consciousness toward self-recollection and 
wisdom. The concept of self-recollection (Erinnerung, also sometimes 
rendered by Hegel as "Er-innerung") is central to Verene's interpreta-
tion. He focuses heavily on the fact that Hegel comes back to this 
concept several times in the last page of the Phenomenology, and that 
Hegel appears to make it central to the task of the self returning 
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to itself via the "grasping" function of the Begriff (Notion, or con-
cept). Verene summarizes this final moment in the life of spirit as 
a "comprehensive knowing" (begreifende wissen)—or a knowledge by 
the spirit of its own shape. This return into the self is accomplished 
by re-collection of the spirit's path toward absolute knowing—the 
hyphen inside "recollection" emphasizes the internal dialectic and 
inwardizing function of the process. Finally, Verene has the hyphen-
ated word speaking to Hegel's "Andness." It might be a strained anal-
ysis to employ about a single grammatical decision, but the hyphen-
ation does occur in a crucial place and Verene's analysis does in fact 
explain a great deal. 
Verene's central thesis in this book has been that the Phenomenol-
ogy is an effort to show the path of consciousness coming to know 
itself after experiencing its own self-estrangement throughout the 
various courses of its experience (this is der Verzweiflung—the path 
of despair). The re-collection of consciousness that culminates in 
absolute knowing is accomplished by reason, which is recollection 
(Erinnerung) as well as speculation. Together, these concepts make 
up Hegel's conception of reason (Vernunft). This speculative reason 
is contrasted to the critical (Kantian) reason of the understanding, 
which has no memory and as a result cannot become dialectical or 
speculative. This thesis has played out consistently throughout the 
entire interpretation, with each piece being skillfully woven into a 
short but dense narrative. Keeping in mind the special limitations 
involved in summarizing the Phenomenology, the book nonetheless 
presents a valid and sound argument culminating in a well-learned, 
accurate interpretation of one of philosophy's great works. 
